http://cnair.top81.cn/J-10_J-11_FC-1.htm



公司某型飞机起落架实现首架交付

Dr. Alexandr Nemets and Dr. Thomas Torda
Tuesday, July 9, 2002
Situation at the End of 2001
In mid-2000, the authors compiled a comprehensive report on China's construction – based on Russian technology – of a multi-level air defense network covering most of China's coast. The essence of this report – which did not attract the attention of U.S. officials – was used in the book "Chinese-Russian Alliance" (compiled in July 2001, to be published by NewsMax in September 2002).
Much has changed in this area – just as in other PLA sectors – in a year, however; this article is an attempt to track the most significant changes.
In 2000-2001, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) adopted the concept of "offensive and defensive character" for the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) instead of the purely "defensive Air Force" concept used for many years – and began implementing it. This immediately resulted in an acceleration of PLA air defense troop development; most of these troops, and almost all long-range and mid-range air defense missile systems, are subordinate to the PLAAF.
What is even more important, in 2001, both the PLAAF and PLA ground forces (focusing on anti-aircraft artillery and air defense missile (ADM) systems of short range and low altitude) concentrated efforts on the improvement of "san da" (three strikes) capabilities, which meant "strike at the enemy's stealth fighters, cruise missiles and attack helicopters."
Development of PLA air defense troops – more precisely, an air defense multi-level network – became even more accelerated. By the end of 2001, this network effectively covered the coastal, most-developed regions of the country as well as the most important areas in the internal regions, and generally included four major levels:
-
At this point it would be proper to quote the article "[Major] Developments in China in the Military Area in 2001," published by the Taiwan-based journal Chung-Kung Yen-chiu (PRC [People's Republic of China] Research) in February 2002:
Presently the PLA is equipped with Russian-made S-300 PMU1 long-range ADM systems, [Russian-made] Tor-M1 field ADM [systems], "Feimeng" improved ADMs for ultra-low altitude, KS-1 mid-range ADMs, and QW-1 shoulder-launched ADMs; they form an all-range road-mobile ADM network.
In addition, the PLA acquired the FT-2000 "anti-radar missile system," to be used against the enemy's electronic warfare aircraft of various kinds and AWACS aircraft. The FT-2000, 6.8 m in length, 0.466 m in diameter, 1.3 tons in weight, has a range between 12 km and 100 km and an effective altitude between 3 km and 20 km. Each FT-2000 launcher has four missile-launching vertical tubes on the mobile platform; the FT-2000 system in its outer appearance is extremely close to the Russian S-300 system." (end of excerpt)
They forgot to mention the Chinese-made (reverse engineered) version of Russia's Tunguska system, known as GPZ-954. (Perhaps Feimeng is just the new name for it?)
One can claim that, by the end of 2001, PLA inventories included many hundreds of road-mobile systems of three upper levels and many thousands of weapons for the lowest level.
Situation in 2002
During the first half of 2002, this air defense network continued its quantitative expansion and qualitative upgrading. The following report characterizes this trend:
(Moscow-based Vedomosti newspaper, April 30, 2002, briefly):
In early April (April 4, by some data), Rosoboronexport (the Russian weapons export monopoly) signed a contract to sell two S-300F ship-borne anti-aircraft complexes to China for $200 million. The contract has increased the newly established (by President Putin's order signed in mid-April) Almaz-Antei Corp. parcel of orders by 50 percent. The Altair Enterprise is the company that produces the S-300F complex. Altair and 20 other designers and producers have become parts of Almaz-Antei.
The S-300F complex is a ship-borne replica of the S-300 anti-aircraft complexes. Beijing plans to install the RIF complexes (the name of the export version of the S-300F) on two warships that will be built in China by 2005. An expert from the Russian Air Force said that the S-300F complexes would be installed by China on cruisers designed by Chinese specialists.
In addition to this contract, Almaz-Antei will receive a contract to build the S-300 anti-aircraft complexes for China ($400 million). As a result, the total sum of its contracts will increase to $600 million. (end of report)
This report was confirmed by publications in the Taiwan and Hong Kong media on June 12-13, 2002, which specified that China is building, with Russian assistance, two "super-Sovremenny" destroyers, to be equipped by RIF ADM systems with a range up to 120 km.
Remarkably, the Chinese air defense network could spread to the sea, as a result of RIF installation on naval vessels, for at least 200 km. Earlier, Chinese frigates and destroyers could barely defend themselves from air strikes. However, Chinese destroyers of the new generation will become "outposts" of a coast-based air defense network.
Just as in the case of weapon platforms of other kinds, China's defense industry does it best for "guochanhua" (reverse engineering) of Russian-made ADM systems.
In 2002-2003, China very probably will master – or has already mastered – serial production of
the following systems, whose development has been under way, based on Russian technology, since 1999-2000:
A single missile system can simultaneously attack eight aircraft or missile targets, with a target-hit probability of 90 percent for any of these targets. The system uses the currently most-advanced vertical launching technology, a phased-array radar, and a composite-guidance warhead. Plans call for the HQ-16 to widely enter PLA service about 2005.
All the listed systems are road-mobile, just like the original S-300 and Tor-M1.
Dr. Alexandr Nemets and Dr. Thomas Torda
Friday, July 26, 2002
In the first half of 2002, the attention of Western military specialists was drawn to two large-scale contracts concluded by China and Russia and aimed at PLA (People's Liberation Army) Navy modernization:
General Structure of the Chinese Shipbuilding Industry
Remarkably, China has a comparatively modern shipbuilding industry; this definitely facilitates PLAN development.
In July 1999, China General Shipbuilding Company was divided, for the purpose of "socialist competition" and accelerated development, into China Shipbuilding Industry Group Corp. (SIGC) and China Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Group Corp. (SHIGC).
SIGC includes several large shipbuilding plants in Shanghai and Guangzhou Shipbuilding Plant, producers of diesel engines and other equipment for vessels. SHIGC includes Dalian Shipbuilding Plant, Dalian New Shipbuilding Plant and Qingdao Shipbuilding Plant, producers of diesel engines for vessels, etc.
During the year 2000, SIGC finished construction of 112 civilian vessels, a total of about 2 million tons deadweight. The volume of production and export increased by about 45 percent from the 1999 level.
Shanghai-based Hudong Shipbuilding Plant, Shanghai-based Jiangnan Shipbuilding Plant and the Guangzhou (capital of Guangdong province) Shipbuilding Plant provided more than 80 percent of the finished deadweight. Several vessels have a deadweight of 80,000-100,000 tons each.
The same year, SHIGC finished construction of 72 civilian vessels, a total of about 1.5 million tons deadweight. Dalian Shipbuilding Plant and Dalian New Shipbuilding Plant provided at least 80 percent of the finished deadweight; this included a 300,000-ton oil tanker for Iran.
By mid-2002, total annual capacity of the two Dalian-based plants approached an estimated 5 million tons deadweight.
Together, the two companies constructed, in 2000, civilian ships of about 3.5 million tons total deadweight. This volume approached 4.5 million tons in 2001 and, by preliminary estimate, could surpass 5 million tons in 2002.
In addition, SIGC and SHIGC annually produce several hundred diesel engines of large capacity and much other equipment for vessels, including sophisticated electronics for control and navigation.
Dr. Alexandr Nemets and Dr. Thomas TordaBrief History of 'Guochanhua'
Thursday, June 13, 2002
The July 1960 break in the Sino-Soviet alliance definitely wasn't a one-time event. The Chinese leaders understood the inevitability of separation by 1958 and did their best to accumulate by all means available - including direct theft - thousands and thousands of sets of the most-advanced Soviet technologies, i.e., weapons know-how, dual-use goods and heavy machinery.
After July 1960, China proclaimed the general course of "basing on our own forces" and concentrating forces on reproducing (reverse engineering, or "guochanhua" in Chinese) the Soviet technology.
China abandoned this autarchy and reinstated ties with the "outer world" after the start of the Great Reform in December 1978. And it appeared that, by the early 1980s, China had completed the reverse engineering of Soviet weapons and heavy machinery.
Generally, it is possible to claim that by about 1984, China acquired the capability to produce - and really master production of, sometimes in single copies - entire sets of Soviet weapons and dual-use products belonging to 1960-61 standards. This in particular included the following (Soviet name first, Chinese name in parentheses):
According to a source in the Ukrainian military industry, the basic design concept of the aircraft has already been finalized. The Chinese military transport aircraft will adopt different design concepts and technologies than the An-70 transport aircraft designed by Ukraine and Russia, the source said, and will be powered by four jet engines. Additional technical details of the transport aircraft are to be finalized after the November signing.
In recent years, China has greatly reinforced its strategic military ties with Ukraine in a variety of areas, but this is the two countries’ first collaboration in developing a large aircraft. A source from the Russian aviation industry says that China did not ask for Russian assistance on this project, suggesting that China is shifting its design cooperation away from Russia and toward Ukraine. It also indicates that the new aircraft will be an upgrade of the An-70 rather than a duplication of it.
China expressed keen interest in the An-70 as early as the mid-1990s, when the aircraft was undergoing flight tests in Russia and Ukraine. The aircraft did not get off to an auspicious start, however. The first prototype was tested in Kiev, Ukraine, in December, 1994, but the same plane crashed the following year. The second prototype was damaged in an accident at Omsk, Russia, in 2001.
In 2002, Russia and Ukraine agreed to each take a 50 percent stake in the project, and two more prototypes were manufactured. But by April, 2006, following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Russia decided to withdraw from the project.
The aircraft is still under test. The Ukrainian Air Force appears to be the only buyer, having announced its intent to procure five of the An-70s. China’s decision to design its own large military transport aircraft on the foundation of the An-70 technologies is apparently intended to take advantage of the extensive testing the aircraft has already undergone, to save research and development time.
The Anatov source has confirmed the Chinese military transport aircraft will not be fitted with the An-70’s D-27 engine, though it did not disclose what type of engine will be used. The D-27 has an output thrust power of 14,000 horsepower, maximum payload of 47 tons and a flight range of 6,600 kilometers (with a payload of 20 tons).
China has recently imported 240 D-30 KP-2 engines from Russia to use in upgrading its H-6K bombers. It is unlikely that this engine would be used for the military transport plane, however. Russia is already replacing some of the D-30KP-2 engines on its Il-76 airlifter with upgraded D-30 KP-3 or PS-90 engines. The D-30KP-2 does not meet Europe’s latest noise control standards, so the Il-76 aircraft powered by these engines are not allowed to land at European airports.
The dispute over a deal involving China’s import of 38 Russian aircraft – 30 Il-76 transport aircraft and eight Il-78 air-to-air refueling tankers – has not been completely resolved. The Russian side insists that the price of the aircraft agreed in a 2005 deal is no longer viable.
The Il-76 is still the mainstay export platform for Russia, hence Russia has not agreed to transfer its production technology to China, nor have the two sides initiated negotiations on this particular issue, according to a source from the Russian aviation industry. It is because of this that China has turned its attention to Ukraine.
Alexander Mikheev, vice president of Rosoboronexport, Russia’s official defense industry exporter, told the author in a recent interview at a U.K. air show that China still intended to pursue the negotiations on the Il-76 and Il-78 aircraft, and the contract was still in effect.
“We demanded to re-discuss the price of the aircraft,” said Mikheev. He denied that a price had already been agreed upon, however. “We are only demanding that the new price should be in line with the international standard,” he said.
Regarding the timeline of resuming production and assembling the aircraft, he stressed that Russia had already allocated funds to build a new factory at Ulianovsk, and the production of the Il-76 transport aircraft would begin in 2011.
China does not have much experience in the design and production of large transport aircraft, nor are its current projects in this area proceeding smoothly. An example is the Y8F-600 medium-sized military transport plane, for which Antonov agreed in 2002 to provide design assistance.
Even though reports from China claim the plane has already been tested, a source from the Ukrainian aviation industry says its maiden flight has been repeatedly put off and has yet to take place.
According to the original design, the Y8F-600 is powered by four PW150B turboprop engines produced by Pratt & Whitney Canada, with British R408 propellers. Test engines have been delivered to China from Canada, purportedly for use in civilian aircraft.
Yet due to pressure from the United States to restrict exports of military technology to China, it is questionable whether Canada will ultimately allow the export of enough P&W engines to meet China’s production needs. Under this circumstance, China will have no choice but to use Russian or Ukrainian engines in its military transport aircraft.
By Yu Tsung-chi 余宗基
In a recent interview with the Financial Times, Chinese Major General Qian Lihua (錢利華), director of the Defense Ministry’s Foreign Affairs Office, said China has every right to build aircraft carriers, without confirming whether it had decided to do so. This enigmatic remark stirred fresh speculation about China’s intentions in developing or acquiring the carriers in light of its economic rise.
China’s intention to build up its own aircraft carriers, viewed as an essential component of building the “blue water” navy able to deploy beyond its coastal waters, has not surprised China watchers. In fact, China has already invested decades of effort in its bid to acquire or develop a monstrous warship.
In 1975 Admiral Liu Huaqing (劉華清), vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, highlighted for first time that China must establish its own aircraft carrier battle group(s) to secure sea lines of communication and protect national sovereignty.
Liu said the goal of developing aircraft carriers was not to start an arms race with the US or the Soviet Union but to meet the requirements for a potential military struggle with Taiwan, settle potential conflicts in the South China Sea, protect its maritime resources, enable China to keep up with regional powers such as India and Japan, give the Chinese navy a decisive edge in future warfare, and participate in the world peacekeeping.
China has purchased four decommissioned carriers: the Melbourne (1985), the Varyag (1998), the Minsk (1998) and the Kiev (2000) from Australia, Ukraine and Russia respectively. Only the Varyag, now docked in Dalien, seems to be a candidate for refurbishment to operational status after photos seen in December 2005 appeared to show activity on the deck to apply new coatings consistent with aircraft operations.
Some specialists, however, believe that these four carriers — which are different in terms of function, designation and structure — must have been used to expedite China’s research and development capabilities in developing its own model.
There have been many reports regarding China’s aircraft carrier intentions. In October 2006, the Russian newspaper Kommersant reported that Russia had signed a US$2.5 billion arms sale contract with China to deliver 48 SU-33 fighters, which the Sukhoi Aviation Bureau designed specifically for carrier operations.
In March last year, a Beijing-backed Hong-Kong newspaper reported that China could have its first aircraft carrier by 2010. Rick Fisher, vice president of the International Assessment and Strategy Center and an expert on the Chinese military, concurred with that report. He believes that “before the end of this decade, we will see preparations for China to build its first indigenous aircraft carrier.”
Jane’s Defence Weekly reported last month that the People’s Liberation Army was training the first batch of 50 cadets to become naval pilots capable of operating aircraft from the mock-up carrier at the Dalian Naval Academy.
All this is evidence that China has a more ambitious and impending timetable than many might think. An aircraft carrier is perceived as a potent symbol of national power, and China is expected to finish building its first aircraft carrier within two to five years.
Such a scenario is cause for concern in East Asia, especially among countries that claim sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, and will definitely have a great impact on other countries in the region — India, Japan, South Korea, Russia and of course, Taiwan — as well as the US.
The case of Taiwan is especially noticeable because if the Varyag can be transformed into China’s first aircraft carrier battle group, it would have a great impact on Taiwan’s defensive operation.
By then, Taiwan’s operational forces would be kept at bay because China’s aircraft carrier(s) could sail off Taiwan’s east coast, beyond the radius of action of fighter jets. This could not only deter foreign forces coming to Taiwan’s aid, but also allow China to attack Taiwan from both sides.
Subsequently, Taiwan’s “forces reservation” at a preliminary stage in east Taiwan, where it reportedly can protect more than half of its sophisticated fighter aircraft, would also be challenged by China’s new capabilities.
Although submarines are believed is the best deterrent to aircraft carriers, Taiwan only has four submarines — two World War II-era subs from the Soviet Union and two Dutch subs imported in the 1980s. These outdated subs are obviously ill-suited to deter China’s new carrier equipped with the state-of-the-art weapon systems supported by Russia.
To remedy the cross-strait status quo tilting in China’s favor, the US must review the hold-up on its offer to sell Taiwan eight submarines. After all, any policy disregarding the Taiwan Relations Act would endanger the equilibrium in the Taiwan Strait and increase the likelihood of war that would involve the US.
An aircraft carrier is also a long-range power project weapon. Such a weapon in China’s hands could serve as augury for China’s rise and to determine if its intentions are hostile.
Some specialists have said that growing Chinese international stature and self-confidence also means fewer releases of human rights activists, less reticence about openly pursuing its military development, and increasing defiance when confronted with criticism.
The US, India and Japan would also be anxious about the prospects of carriers, about how they will be used in the Chinese fleet and what impact they will have on China’s foreign policy.
China’s military actions in recent years are particularly alarming. In April 2001 China ignored international law in holding a US EP3 flight crew for 12 days; in November 2006 a Chinese submarine surfaced in the vicinity of a US Navy aircraft battle group in the East China Sea; in January last year China launched its anti-satellite weapon without a public notice, putting at risk other nations’ space assets.
Even as cross-strait relations are thawing, China has not hesitated to deploy cutting-edge YJ-62 guided missiles with a maximum range in excess of 400km along the southeast coastline opposite Taiwan. These missiles are a military threat and hostile gesture toward not only Taiwan but toward all of China’s neighbors.
This is clearly at odds with China’s claim of peaceful rise or peaceful development. In fact, improving Sino-American strategic relations are conditioned upon China not challenging US global leadership, a position that Chinese leaders have repeatedly stressed. China’s rigorous military reach-out, however, is now being interpreted otherwise. The more China’s flexes its military muscle the more defiant it may become.
To mollify its neighbors’ worries, it would behoove China to explain the purposes and intentions behind its carrier-building program. The more transparent China is about its military and security affairs, the less other nation’s militaries have to assume the worst and respond accordingly, leading to potential misunderstandings, miscalculations and an action-reaction cycle of military preparations, to the detriment of all sides.
Yu Tsung-chi is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in the US.
This story has been viewed 190 times.
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2008/11/28/2003429792
Chinese-American scientist Quan-Sheng Shu, shown in a file photo, pleaded guilty Nov. 17, 2008, to passing on rocket technology to the Chinese government and bribing Chinese officials. (Adrin Snider, Daily Press / December 6, 2002)
VIRGINIA PHYSICIST PLEADS GUILTY TO ILLEGALLY EXPORTING SPACE LAUNCH DATA TO CHINA AND OFFERING BRIBES TO CHINESE OFFICIALS
WASHINGTON – A physicist in Newport News, Va., has pleaded guilty today to charges that he illegally exported space launch technical data and defense services to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and offered bribes to Chinese government officials.
The guilty plea was announced today by Dana Boente, Acting U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; Patrick Rowan, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Matthew Friedrich, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division; Arthur M. Cummings, II, Executive Assistant Director, FBI National Security Branch; and Alex J. Turner, Special Agent-in-Charge, FBI Norfolk Division.
Shu Quan-Sheng (Shu), 68, a native of China, naturalized U.S. citizen and Ph.D. physicist, entered his plea before Judge Henry C. Morgan, Jr. in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. Shu is the President, Secretary and Treasurer of AMAC International Inc., (AMAC), a high-tech company based in Newport News and that has offices in Beijing.
Shu pleaded guilty to a three-count criminal information. Count one alleges that from January 2003 through October 2007, Shu violated the Arms Export Control Act by willfully exporting a defense service from the United States to the PRC without first obtaining the required export license or written approval from the State Department. Specifically, the information alleges that Shu provided the PRC with assistance in the design and development of a cryogenic fueling system for space launch vehicles to be used at the heavy payload launch facility located in the southern island province of Hainan, PRC.
The space launch facility at Hainan will house liquid-propelled heavy payload launch vehicles designed to send space stations and satellites into orbit, as well as provide support for manned space flight and future lunar missions, according to a criminal complaint filed in the case. Among those PRC government entities involved in the Hainan facility are the People's Liberation Army's General Armaments Department and the 101st Research Institute (101 Institute), which is one of many research institutes that make up the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, as overseen by the Commission of Science Technology and Industry for the National Defense, according to the criminal complaint.
Count two of the criminal information alleges that on Dec. 20, 2003, Shu violated the Arms Export Control Act by willfully exporting a defense article to the PRC without first obtaining the required export license or written approval from the State Department. Specifically, the information alleges that Shu illegally exported to the PRC controlled military technical data contained in a document entitled “Commercial Information, Technical Proposal and Budgetary Officer – Design, Supply, Engineering, Fabrication, Testing & Commissioning of 100m3 Liquid Hydrogen Tank and Various Special Cryogenic Pumps, Valves, Filters and Instruments.”
Count three of the criminal information alleges that Shu offered, paid, promised and authorized the payment of bribes to Chinese government officials to influence their decisions and secure an improper advantage, in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Specifically, Shu, acting on behalf of his company, AMAC, and a French company he represented, offered to pay money to foreign officials of the PRC’s 101 Institute to obtain a contract for the development of a 600 liter per hour liquid hydrogen tank system, according to the information.
The criminal information indicates that Shu offered money on three occasions to three PRC officials with the 101 Institute to secure the contract. In February 2006, he offered “percentage points” worth approximately $56,800. In April 2006, he offered “percentage points” worth some $56,800, and in May 2006, he offered “percentage points” worth approximately $75,700, for a total of $189,300, according to the criminal information. In January 2007, the $4 million hydrogen liquefier project was awarded to the French company that Shu represented.
Sentencing in this matter is scheduled for April 6, 2009, where Shu faces a possible maximum sentence of 10 years in prison and a fine of $1,000,000 for each violation of the Arms Export Control Act, and a possible maximum sentence of five years in prison and a fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain for violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
This investigation was conducted by the FBI, with assistance from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement.
The prosecution is being handled Assistant U.S. Attorney Alan M. Salsbury from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia and Assistant Chief Robertson Park from the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section.. The Counterespionage Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division provided critical assistance.
"Shu admitted to a lengthy set of facts, laid out in a 20-page statement detailing his four years of negotiations with the Chinese, with the help of an unidentified French company, for the design and development of a cryogenic liquid hydrogen rocket system.
http://hamptonroads.com/2008/11/physicist-pleads-guilty-selling-technology-chinaBy Richard Spencer in Beijing
Last Updated: 6:57AM GMT 17 Nov 2008
Major General Qian Lihua, a senior official with the ministry of defence, seemed to accept speculation that China was planning to build an aircraft carrier, though he would not confirm when it might be launched.
"The question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier," he said.
But he said a carrier fleet would only be used for defence, unlike that of "another country".
"Navies of great powers with more than 10 aircraft carrier battle groups with strategic military objectives have a different purpose from countries with only one or two carriers used for offshore defence," he said.
"Even if one day we have an aircraft carrier, unlike another country, we will not use it to pursue global deployment or global reach." China has issued repeated hints that it is planning to build an aircraft carrier in recent years, and according to Jane's Defence Weekly recently began training 50 pilots for fixed-wing carrier-based aircraft.
But after initial plans were aborted in the 1990s, projected dates for a carrier group taking to the high seas remain unclear. A South Korean newspaper earlier this year reported that a mid-sized carrier was due to be completed by 2010, and a large nuclear-powered one by 2020.
Other analysts say China may already be working on three carriers, but say none is likely to be operational before 2015.
China's main naval priority is to deter American intervention in any conflict over Taiwan. One reason why the country has not yet developed an aircraft carrier fleet, unlike regional rivals like India, is said to be a desire to balance Washington's concern at its rapidly increasing submarine fleet, targeted at American battle groups.
The United States navy has 11 aircraft carrier groups deployed around the world, including one based in Japan.
But this balance may not last much longer, despite warming ties between Beijing and Taiwan.
"The navy of any great power has the dream to have one or more aircraft carriers," Maj Gen Qian said in the interview with The Financial Times.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/3470499/China-defends-ambition-to-build-aircraft-carr3 Ind REGT | 3 Fighter DIV | 10 Bomber DIV | 14 Fighter DIV |
26 Fighter DIV | 28 Attack DIV | 29 Fighter DIV |
Nanjing Military Region | |||
---|---|---|---|
22 Group Army | 29 Group Army | 60 Group Army | |
1 Group Army | 12 Group Army | 31 Group Army | Shanghai Garrison |
U/I Motorized Infantry BDE | 179 Motorized Infantry BDE | U/I Armored BDE | |
1 Amph Mechanized Infantry DIV | 34 Motorized Infantry BDE | 86 Infantry DIV | |
U/I Armored DIV | 2 Armored DIV | 91 Motorized Infantry DIV | |
36th DIV | |||
U/I DIV |